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INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF THE SAFETY OF
NUCLEAR-POWERED MERCHANT SHIPSf

William H. Berman* and Lee M. Hydeman**
Few men combine the attributes of scholarship, leadership, imagination, industry,
and intellectual curiosity that have characterized the professional career of E.
Blythe Stason. It was typical, for example, in 19-16, when the full implications of
the peaceful uses of atomic energy were merely a glimmer to most persons, that
this man would have the foresight to recognize that nuclear technology would have
a great impact on both public and private law. It was still more typical that Dean
Stason, having recognized this inevitable amalgamation of science and law, would
undertake to become an authority on the problems that loomed ahead. In the
ensuing years Dean Stason has made both significant and voluminous contributions
to the legal, policy, and, for the layman, technical literature on atomic energy and
the law. [See p. 185 supra. - Ed.]
Dean Stason has brought his wisdom and experience in the field of administrative
law to bear upon the many complex public law problems which the peaceful uses
of atomic energy have engendered. His published works in this field have ranged
from an early paper on the difficulties likely to be encountered, and the juridical
dangers, in attempting to regulate complex technological activities, to a more recent
collaborative monograph in which the authors proposed an imaginative and
practicable role for state governments in connection with the control of radiation
hazards.
Since 1956 Dean Stason's efforts have been devoted increasingly to the private
law aspects of radiation injury. A series of speeches and articles pertaining to the
tort liability aspects of atomic energy culminated in 1959 in the publication (with
Professors Estep and Pierce) of Atoms and the Law, a comprehensive and scholarly
volume which will stand as the definitive treatise on the radiation liability problem
for years to come.
During the past two years the authors have had the privilege and pleasure of
working under the general guidance of this man of remarkable qualities and
achievements. This close association has increased their admiration and respect for
him. It is, then, with sincere affection that the paper which follows is dedicated
to a friend and mentor, Dean E. Blythe Stason. - W.H.B. and L.M.H.

recent years we have witnessed the transition of nuclearpowered ships from an imaginative dream to an engineering
reality. This vast step from the drawing board to successful operation on the high-seas has taken place in a remarkably short
span of time. Nevertheless, in the :flush of enthusiasm over the
technological achievement, we must not lose sight of the fact that
the promise of nuclear power for the propulsion of ships will not
have been fulfilled until nuclear vessels are operating safely and
economically over the maritime trade routes of the world. It
would be unrealistic to assume that further progress, from military
and demonstration vessels subsidized by governments, to com-
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t This article is based upon a paper which the authors presented before EURATOM's
International Symposium on Legal and Administrative Problems of Protection in the
Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, Brussels, Belgium, Sept. 5-8, 1960.
• Member, District of Columbia and Ohio bars; co-director of The University of Michigan Law School Atomic Energy Research Project.-Ed.
•• Member, District of Columbia bar; co-director of The University of l\.fichigan Law
School Atomic Energy Research Project. - Ed.

234

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 59

mercially competitive merchantmen, will not be more difficult,
more time-consuming, and more taxing to our ingenuity than the
steps taken thus far.
l.

THE PROBLEMS OF NUCLEAR SHIP OPERATION

Significant technical, legal, and administrative problems remain as barriers to the widespread operation of nuclear merchant
vessels. The major categories of difficulty are ship economics, ship
safety, and legal liability for radiation damage. These interrelated
problem areas have been highlighted by three major conferences
during the past year.

A.

Ship Economics

The primary requisite to the commercial operation of nuclear
ships is to make them economically competitive with conventional
ships. This was the principal subject of a merchant ship industry
conference in Philadelphia in April 1960.1 The Philadelphia
Conference was neither planned nor expected to achieve specific
solutions to problems of the economics of nuclear ships. In fact,
to a considerable extent, the Conference constituted a restatement
of earlier predictions on the achievement of economic nuclear
vessels2 and an intensification of conflicting views on the outlook.3
The Conference, however, did serve the valuable purpose of providing new perspective. In this connection, a significant observation was made in partial response to the general mood of pessimism
that pervaded the Conference; the speaker noted that most existing
plans for the nuclear propulsion of ships are still on paper and
pointed out that "you make much greater progress when you work
with things." 4 In addition, the nature of many of the existing
technological problems, and the areas of development most worthy
of early attention, were identified distinctly.5 Further, it was made
1 Conference on the Role of Nuclear Propulsion in Merchant Shipping, sponsored by
the Atomic Industrial Forum, April 28-30, 1960.
2 HYDEMAN & BERMAN, INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF NUCLEAR MARmME AcnvmES

9

(1960).
3 Contrast, for example, the assertion of John H. Lancaster, Bethlehem Steel Company,
that economic nuclear ships may be one hundred years in the future, N.Y. Times, April
30, 1960, p. 36M, col. 8, with the statement of David L. Gorman, George G. Sharp, Inc.,
to the effect that certain ship applications of nuclear propulsion would be competitive
now, reported in Atomic Industrial Forum, The Forum Memo, May 1960, p. 10.
4 Luncheon remarks of Francis K. McCune, reported in Atomic Industrial Forum,
The Forum Memo, May 1960, p. 10.
5 Remarks of Louis H. Roddis, Jr., Chairman, NAS-NRC Maritime Research Advisory
Committee, reported in Bureau of National Affairs, Atomic Industry Reporter, News and
Analysis 6:139 (1960).
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abundantly clear that nuclear ship technology cannot be viewed
as a mere extension of the technology for central station power
plants,° and that the achievement of economic nuclear ships will
not be easy. In this latter context, there was general recognition
that effective solutions to the concomitant problems of legal
liability and safety control could be instrumental in facilitating
the approach to competitive nuclear propulsion and essential to
ultimate success.
B.

Liability for Nuclear Damage

Another nongovernmental conference on nuclear ships took
place in Rijeka, Yugoslavia in September 1959, and was directed
to the problem of potential liability for damage arising out of a
release of fission products from a nuclear-powered ship. The
Rijeka Conference was convened by the International Maritime
Committee in recognition of the importance of an early resolution
of the liability problem and of the fact that none of the nuclear
liability conventions then under consideration7 was sufficiently
comprehensive to cover nuclear-powered vessels. The Conference
prepared a draft convention on the liability of ship operators.8
The Rijeka draft provides for the sole and absolute liability of
the operator for radiation injuries arising out of the fuel used in
the ship,0 except for willful damage caused by claimants or others.I_O
The draft also deals with related matters, such as the establishment
of a period of limitation on claims and the selection of a forum
for asserting claims, and adopts a specific rule to cover instances
of contributory nuclear damage.11 Two vital matters, however~
remain open. First, although the draft provides for a limitation
on the liability of a duly licensed operator, no specific monetary
limit was adopted.12 Second, the draft requires only that an op6 In his remarks, Louis H. Roddis, Jr. directed attention to the difference in power
level requirements between most ships and central station power plants. Ibid. For an
extensive description of the major differences between ship and stationary reactor power
plants, sec HYDEMAN & BERMAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 84-87.
7 In September, 1959, Euratom, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation,
and the International Atomic Energy Agency all were preparing or considering drafts of
liability conventions for land-based atomic energy activities.
8 THE MARITIME LAw AssocIATION OF THE UNITED STATES, FINAL ENGLISH DRAFT OF
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION RELATING TO TIIE L\BILITY OF OPERATORS OF NUCLEAR SHIPS,
Document No. 434, October 20, 1959.
o Id., Art. II (i).
10 Id., Art. II (v) &: (vi).
11 Id., Arts. V, VII, &: XII.
12 ld., Art. III (i), provides that "An operator of a nuclear ship ••• shall in no circumstances be liable for more than _ _ _ _ in respect of any one nuclear incident.•••"
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erator maintain the amount of insurance specified by the licensing
State;13 no agreement was reached on what would be an appropriate
amount of insurance. It is precisely in these unresolved issues that
the major problems of international agreement on the liability
question lie.
A limit on liability, of course, must be sufficiently high to make
nuclear ships acceptable in most ports. As indicated by experience
·with land-based nuclear facilities, such a limit probably will be
beyond the capacity of the insurance underwriters. In recognition
of these facts, the delegates to the Rijeka Conference acknowledged
that governmental indemnification probably would be necessary
to supplement available insurance.14 However, they took the position that a monetary limit on liability, the amount and terms of
insurance required, and the means for supplementing insurance
with governmental indemnities, were all essentially matters for
governments to resolve at a diplomatic conference.15 Thus, while
the Rijeka Conference did achieve specific agreement on a number
of difficult legal questions, the issues most crucial to a resolution of
the problem of legal liability were not resolved.16
C.

Ship Safety

The third of the recent conferences dealing ·with nuclear
propulsion for ships, and the one of primary concern for purposes
of this paper, was the intergovernmental Safety of Life at Sea
(SOLAS) Conference in London during May and June of 1960.
While the Conference was concerned with the general subject of
ship safety, one committee17 devoted its efforts exclusively to possible amendments to the 1948 Safety of Life at Sea Convention18
to provide for regulating the safety of nuclear-powered vessels. To
facilitate an appreciation of the context in which these discussions
were held, some background on the traditional approach to international agreement on the safety of ships at sea is necessary.
13 Id., Art. III (ii).
14Id., Recommendations, I, Art. m.
15 Ibid. Present plans contemplate the convening of such a diplomatic conference by
the Government of Belgium during 1961.
16 An excellent summary of the liability problem is contained in Konz, On International Action in Connection with Liability and Insurance for Nuclear Powered Ships, re•
marks before the Conference on the Role of Nuclear Propulsion in Merchant Shipping,
supra note I.
17 The Committee on the Safety of Nuclear-Powered Ships.
18 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1948, June 10, 1948, T.I.A.S.
No. 2495, 164 U.N.T.S. 113.
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The first SOLAS Conference was convened in 1914, largely as
an outgrowth of the S.S. Titanic disaster. Other major conferences
on ship safety followed in 1929, 1930, and 1948.19 At these later
conferences, maritime safety conventions were drafted; the Load
Line Convention of 193020 and the Safety of Life at Sea Convention
of 194821 remain in force. The basic approach to control adopted
by both conventions is identical. They contain detailed regulations pertinent to various elements of ship safety. Contracting
States are obligated to impose the substance of those regulations on
ships which fly their flags and are authorized to issue safety certificates to those vessels as evidence of compliance. While primary
responsibility for inspection and for enforcement of the regulations
is reposed in the flag State, other contracting States have the right
to inspect and verify the seaworthiness of foreign vessels which
have entered their ports and, under some circumstances, to detain
such vessels for violation of the conventions. The conventions do
not impose a clear obligation on contracting States to admit vessels
certificated by other contracting States; nor do they provide contracting States with a clear right to exclude certificated vessels
which they deem unsafe. The conventions require only that contracting States treat vessels certificated by other contracting States
on a par with their own ships.22
Two important characteristics of this existing pattern for dealing with vessel safety by international agreement need to be
identified and related to the problems engendered by the nuclear
propulsion of ships.
First, assurance of ship safety has, in the past, been achieved
through agreement on detailed design, construction, and operating
standards and by the adoption of an approach to control over individual ships that is essentially unilateral in character. Precise
criteria, however, are not yet possible for most elements of the
safety of nuclear ships. During the present research and developmental stage of reactor technology, the large reactors which are
10 A brief but excellent history of the SOLAS Conferences is set forth in UNITED STATES
COAST GUARD, INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS AND CONFERENCES ON MARINE SAFETY, Department of the Treasury, CG 242 at 9-11 (1951). A conference to establish uniform principles
and rules with regard to the limits to which ships on international voyages may be loaded
was held in London in 1930.
20 International Load Linc Convention, July 5, 1930, 47 Stat. 2228, T .S. No. 858, 135
L.N.T .S. 301.
21 Note 18 supra. The convention entered into force on November 19, 1952.
22 SOLAS Convention, supra note 18, Ch. I, General Provisions, Regulation 16; Load
Line Convention, supra note 20, Art. 15.
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necessary for ship propulsion are not standardized. Even with
respect to existing reactor types, only limited operating experience
is available and many design changes for each new model can be
expected. Reasonable assurance of the safety of a nuclear power
plant, therefore, can be achieved only by means of a detailed
hazards analysis of each reactor system. Such an evaluation must
be made in light of all of the safety features designed into the
reactor system, and must include consideration of the type of ship
involved as well as the operating plans proposed for the vessel.
Because of the many variables and their complete interrelationship
in achieving the goal of reactor safety, about all that can be done
by way of establishing an international reactor code is to set forth
a general safety criterion, such as requiring "reasonable assurance
that the health and safety of the public will be protected," and to
specify the nature of the hazard evaluation which should be undertaken. Although somewhat more detailed standards may be
possible with respect to the construction of the hulls of nuclear
ships and ·with respect to navigational requirements, hull construction standards undoubtedly will have to vary considerably with the
size, type and function of particular vessels, and operating criteria,
by and large, will be meaningful only if developed in detail in a
context of the navigational hazards of a specific port or coastal
area. In general, then, nuclear ship construction and operation
is not amenable to the detailed standards that have been incorporated in existing conventions which deal with the safety of
ships.23
The second noteworthy characteristic of the existing pattern of
international agreement on the safety of ships stems from the fact
that the relatively standardized technology of conventional ships,
and the hazards incident to their operation, have not required
nations to consider an extensive revision of customary rules of international law pertaining to the relative rights and obligations of
vessels and coastal States in the various regimes of the sea. As a
result, ship safety conventions have merely specified the right of
coastal States to inspect foreign vessels about to enter their ports
and have required that such States treat vessels certificated by other
contracting States on a par with their own ships. There are, however, areas of uncertainty in international law regarding the rights
of vessels and coastal States, particularly ·with respect to passage
23 For a discussion of the problems of establishing detailed safety standards for the
construction and operation of nuclear ships, see HYDEMAN & BERMAN, op. cit. supra note
2, at 87-103.
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through territorial waters and through areas of the high seas contiguous to those waters, 24 which are likely to assume greater significance in a context of potential nuclear hazards. Under existing
rules of international law, the distance beyond territorial waters
at which health and safety controls can be imposed is uncertain; the
right of a State to require the submission of information relating to
safety as a condition of passage through its territorial sea is open to
question; and the right of a coastal State to exclude foreign vessels
in distress for reasons of safety is equivocal.
Thus, in undertaking to deal with nuclear ships, the 1960
Safety of Life at Sea Conference was confronted with novel problems which required at least some consideration of a departure from
the traditional pattern of controlling ship safety.
II.

A.

AN APPROACH TO THE HEALTH AND SAFETY CONTROL OF
NUCLEAR SHIPS
The 1960 Safety of Life at Sea Conference Proposals

The proposals adopted by the 1960 SOLAS Conference with
respect to nuclear ships25 would incorporate in the 1948 Convention only a few, new, formalized regulations. These are limited
to statements of general principles and procedures.26 In addition,
the Conference adopted a number of recommendations to provide
guidance for governments in the application of those principles
and procedures.27 The proposed regulations provide that nuclear
ships are subject to all other rules of the Convention.28 In broad
outline, the regulations require approval by each flag State of the
design, construction, and standards of inspection of the reactor
installation,20 prescribe the development of a fully detailed operating manual,30 and call for the conduct of periodic surveys by the
flag State.31 The test of radiation safety is " ... that there are no
unreasonable radiation or other nuclear hazards, at sea or in port,
to the crew, passengers, or public, or to the watenvays or food or
water resources. " 32
24 For a detailed discussion of present legal rights and obligations of vessels and coastal
States, id. at 123-295.
25 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SAFEIT OF LIFE AT SEA, IMCO Doc. No. IMCO/
SAFCON/25/Rev. 1 (1960).
20 Id., Annex B (Revised), Ch. VIII, Nuclear Ships.
27 Id., Annex C (Revised), Recommendations Applicable to Nuclear Ships.
28 Note 26 supra, Regulations 2 &: 3.
20 Id., Regulations 4 &: 5.
30 Id., Regulation 8.
81 Id., Regulation 9.
82 Id., Regulation 6.
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Administratively, the proposed regulations incorporate a new
control device. A flag State is required to prepare a "Safety Assessment" consonant with the prescribed test of safety,33 and to
make the safety assessment " ... available sufficiently in advance to
the Contracting Governments of the countries which a nuclear
ship intends to visit so that they may evaluate the safety of the
ship." 34 The flag State may issue Nuclear Ship Safety Certificates.35 Presumably, consistent with the SOLAS requirements
pertaining to conventional ships, such certificates would entitle a
nuclear ship to be treated by foreign States on a par with nuclear
vessels to which such States have issued their own certificates.
Coastal States are authorized to inspect a vessel prior to its entry
into ports36 for purposes of verifying the validity of the certificate
and of determining whether operation is being conducted in conformance with the prescribed test of nuclear safety.
These proposals for the control of nuclear ships follow closely
the pattern of existing conventions on ship safety and incorporate
only such departures from the traditional approach as are clearly
necessitated by the present state of nuclear technology or by the
demands which the Conference anticipated that coastal States
would make. The areas of departure from tradition are these.
First, the proposals do not incorporate detailed safety standards;
rather, in recognition of the unstandardized state of the reactor
art and the complex task of assuring reactor safety, a broad safety
criterion is adopted and an evaluation of each nuclear ship by the
flag State is required. Second, the proposals contemplate the
advance transmittal of an evaluation report from the flag State to
other States to permit an appraisal of the safety of the vessel prior
to the time it seeks entry into the ports of those States.
33 Id.,

Regulation 7 (a).
Regulation 7 (b). The description in the Recommendations of the appropriate
contents of the Safety Assessment is in very general terms. Note 27 supra, Recommendation
9. For example, the flag State is enjoined to make"•.• an evaluation of credible accidents
which indicates that the hazards are minimized." Experience in the United States with
reactor evaluations would indicate that this language could mean all things to all men.
Consequently, precisely what constitutes an appropriate "evaluation of credible reactor
accidents" may be a significant stumbling-block in achieving mutually acceptable arrangements between flag and coastal States.
35 Note 26 supra, Regulation 10.
86 Id., Regulation 11. The Regulation does not specify at what distance the coastal
State may assert this inspection right. Thus, it would seem that whatever exclusion rights
are implicit in the provision for advance inspection, they may not include the right of the
coastal State to exclude a vessel from territorial waters.

34 Id.,
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Goals of International Accord on the Safety of Nuclear Ships

Before turning to an assessment of the adequacy of the 1960
SOLAS Conference proposals, it is important to identify the goals
of international agreement on the health and safety control of nuclear-powered ships. First and foremost, of course, is the necessity
of assuring that nuclear vessels are safe. The use of atomic energy
for the propulsion of vessels adds new scope to the problem of
ship safety. Risk no longer will be confined to persons or property
on board vessels or in the immediate harbor areas of ports. A
major release of fission products from a ship's power plant could
cause almost immediate and widespread damage on shore areas
more than fifty miles away. 37 In addition, such an incident could
endanger other vessels within a considerable area, could contaminate the resources of the sea within an even greater radius, and
could result in increased radiation levels in any region toward
which there is a current or wind drift from the site of the release.
Thus, not only do nuclear ships constitute an increased risk for individual coastal States, but they also present a significant hazard
to the general interests of the community of nations in the resources and use of the high seas.
A second goal of international accord is the achievement of a
climate that will encourage the development and use of nuclear
propulsion for ships. The capital investment required for such
ships is very substantial. Absent a proper developmental climate,
which presupposes a significant degree of advance assurance that
nuclear vessels will be comparatively free to pursue normal commercial trade routes, even governments may not undertake the
necessa,ry investments. Customary international law and existing
bilateral and multilateral treaties provide coastal States with considerable latitude to regulate and even prevent foreign vessels from
traversing territorial waters for the purpose of entering ports, and
may provide a basis for control well beyond territorial limits.38
This means that unless nations agree upon the nature and limits of
controls that can be exercised by coastal States, and devise a system
which assures that nuclear vessels can enter most ports under some
37 E.g.,

see

UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, BROOKHAVEN REPORT, THEO-

RETICAL POSSIBJI.ITIES OF MAJOR ACCIDENTS IN LARGE NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS, WASH-740

(1957).
38 HYDEMAN & BERMAN,

op. cit. supra note 2, at 236-40.
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reasonable conditions, incentive for the construction of nuclear
ships may be lacking.
A third goal of international agreement on nuclear ships is the
avoidance of disputes between nations. As we have seen, at the
present time a criterion of nuclear safety can be only very general
and therefore imprecise. We also have identified some of the
numerous circumstances under which international law is equivocal with respect to the unilateral acts a coastal State is entitled
to take in order to protect itself from a significant risk of injury to
its interests. When these facts are taken in conjunction with the
prevailing widespread fear over radiation hazards, the operation
of nuclear-powered ships is clearly an area of atomic energy activity
ripe for international controversy.
A fourth goal of international agreement is the establishment
of a health and safety control system which will provide a realistic
framework for achieving a solution to the problem of liability for
injury and damage due to nuclear ship accidents.

C.

An Evaluation of the SOLAS Proposals

In light of these goals, it is possible to identify a number of
deficiencies that are inherent in the approach to the control of
nuclear ships taken by the 1960 SOLAS Conference.
I. Assuring Health and Safety. From the standpoint of assuring coastal States that their citizens and territories will be adequately protected from nuclear hazards, the SOLAS proposals
leave a good deal to be desired. The great majority of coastal
States do not yet have the skills or experience to undertake meaningful reactor evaluations, or even to assess evaluation reports
transmitted to them by flag States. Even those few States which
have achieved a considerable degree of sophistication in reactor
technology may be somewhat less than fully reassured by the
right to analyze an evaluation report made by a foreign State. This
is particularly true because a thorough evaluation necessitates not
only a review of final plans and operating procedures, but a detailed
examination of components as they are fabricated or embodied in
a reactor system. Thus, as a practical matter, the great majority of
coastal States, and to a lesser degree all of them, will be placing
primary reliance on the good faith and ability of the flag State.
The significance of this weakness in the 1960 SOLAS proposals may be magnified by the prevalence of a practice of registering privately-owned vessels with States which impose the lowest
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registration charges, minimal labor standards, and the least costly
safety requirements. The possible future use of flags of convenience for nuclear ships is particularly troublesome because the
States most commonly used in this respect are frequently those
with relatively undeveloped degrees of technological competence.
Admittedly, only nations of considerable technological sophistication are likely to have the facilities for constructing nuclear ships.
However, even assuming a properly built vessel, assurance of safety
will depend very much upon continuing surveillance by individuals who have had a great deal of training and experience in reactor
technology. It is doubtful that nations which hold themselves out
as flags of convenience could, or by inclination would, obtain the
services of foreign experts to undertake the task of continuing to
review the safety of nuclear vessels which they register. To date,
efforts to restrict the use of flags of convenience have not been
particularly successful.39 Nor was there any meaningful effort to
deal with this problem, either directly or indirectly,40 in the recent
SOLAS Conference.
The right of a coastal State to exclude nuclear vessels from its
ports does not rectify these deficiencies in the SOLAS proposals.
Because of the distance at which a fission product release can cause
injury or damage, mere exclusion from territorial seas, or even
from reasonably extended contiguous areas of the high seas, will
not necessarily provide coastal States with a guarantee of the protection of their interests. In addition, a coastal State's use of the right
to exclude vessels as a general method of protecting itself would
have an obvious adverse impact on its economic and diplomatic
relationships.
From the standpoint of protecting the interests of the whole
community of nations, the 1960 SOLAS proposals are even less
effective and for substantially identical reasons. The safety of
so The recent efforts of the 1958 Conference on the Law of the Sea to require a closer
connection between a vessel and a State in order to justify registry with that State were far
from adequate. The Convention on the High Seas, which was developed by the Conference, provides only that "There must be a genuine link between the State and the
ship•..•" U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.13/L.53 (1958), Art. 5. For a discussion of the inadequacy of this provision, see McDougal, The Maintenance of Public Order at Sea and the
Nationality of Ships, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 25, 28-30 (1960).
40 The Conference proposals merely require that the flag State keep its safety assessment of the vessel up-to-date and specify that that State "assumes full responsibility for
the certificate" of safety which it issues. Note 26 supra, Regulations 7 (a) and 10 (f). Even
had the Conference not deemed it propitious to deal more comprehensively with the question directly, it could have adopted some method of imposing sanctions on flag States that
do not live up to their international obligation to assure the safety of nuclear vessels under
their jurisdiction. Sec discussion infra, p. 254.
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other vessels on the high seas, and the protection of the resources
of the high seas from the risks engendered by any particular nuclear ship, will depend entirely on the degree to which a flag State
voluntarily complies with its international obligations. While
coastal States can take some steps under international law to protect
persons or property within territorial limits, no compulsory legal
forum exists for enforcing the rights of nations to navigate and
use the resources of the high seas.
In final analysis, then, the SOLAS proposals incorporate no effective means for an independent check on whether a flag State is
meeting its international obligations, a question that cannot be
resolved very satisfactorily by the cursory and varied inspections
which will take place when a vessel is waiting to enter ports. In
addition, the proposals fail to embody general sanctions designed
to stimulate flag State compliance with those obligations.
2. Encouraging Use and Development. A second limitation
inherent in the 1960 SOLAS Conference approach is the likelihood
that it will not create a developmental climate that will encourage
investment in the application of nuclear propulsion to ships. In
the first place, the procedures prescribed for obtaining permission
to enter foreign ports may well prove economically onerous. The
probability that ship operators will be required to obtain advance
approval from a considerable number of coastal States, each approval being based on a detailed review of the initial safety assessment made by the flag State, is likely to constitute a significant
burden. In addition, different national interpretations of a general
criterion of nuclear safety may result in inconsistent or even incompatible requirements, thus adding to the burden. Moreover,
since it would be impractical to have five or ten nations evaluating
the safety of a nuclear propulsion plant concurrently with its design, construction, and evaluation by the flag State, the assessment
of the safety of a vessel by other States probably will take place only
after construction is completed. At that time, changes or alterations which those States may require are likely to be extremely
expensive if they are possible at all. None of these circumstances
is conducive to investment in a technology that is economically
marginal.
Second, the SOLAS proposals will not provide the prospective
builder of a nuclear vessel with much assurance that his ship, even
if certificated by the flag State, will be able to operate freely in international commerce. As we have seen, the 1948 SOLAS Con-
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vention does not impose an affirmative obligation on coastal States
to admit foreign vessels; it merely requires them to treat such
vessels on a par with their flag ships. Until most coastal States
have nuclear vessels flying their flags, the concept of equal treatment will not be very meaningful. And, even when most coastal
States have registered nuclear vessels, a requirement of "equal
treatment" will not prove very reassuring to an operator until we
are able to develop detailed safety standards or other means of assuring reasonably uniform interpretations of a general criterion of
reactor safety.41
The failure of the SOLAS proposals to provide nuclear ship
operators with a reasonable degree of advance assurance that their
vessels will have access to foreign ports could, of course, be alleviated by the negotiation of formal bilateral agreements between a
flag State and all coastal States which each nuclear vessel is likely to
visit. This remedy, however, ultimately may prove to be more
harmful than the ill. Assuming that a considerable number of
nuclear merchant vessels are in eventual prospect, the solution presupposes a world-wide complex of bilateral agreements that will be
confusing and perhaps impossible to administer effectively. Moreover, even if we suppose conservatively only one hundred nuclear
vessels,42 the mere negotiation of bilateral agreements can be expected to tax severely governmental and industrial resources of
technically qualified personnel.
3. Avoiding International Controversy. A third deficiency
inherent in the 1960 SOLAS proposals is the absence of effective
means for preventing international disputes. Without a yardstick
to assure reasonably uniform interpretations of a broad safety
criterion, it is inevitable that different nations, and even different
41 When most coastal States have vessels flying their flags and there has been international agreement on detailed ship safety standards, as is the situation for conventional
vessels under the SOLAS and Load Line conventions, the concept of equal treatment affords
a meaningful degree of assurance to ship operators. Absent either factor, the concept of
equal treatment will mean very little. If a State has no comparable vessel of its own, it
will remain entirely free to treat foreign vessels arbitrarily. If a State does have comparable
vessels flying its flag but detailed ship safety standards are lacking, the leeway of interpretation afforded by a very general criterion of safety will leave it relatively free to act arbitrarily with respect to foreign vessels. See HYDEMAN & BERMAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at
366, and discussion infra, pp. 249-50.
42 A recent study by a working group of the United States National Academy of Sciences, for example, adopted a premise of 300 nuclear-powered vessels by about 1970.
PRITCHARD, and others, CONSIDERATIONS ON THE DISPOSAL OF RADIOACTIVE WASTES FROM
NUCLEAR POWERED SHIPS INTO THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES NATIONAL R.EsEARCH COUNCIL REPORT at 7 (Pub. No. 658, 1959).
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authorities within a nation, will disagree as to what constitutes an
"unreasonable radiation or other nuclear hazard." 43 And, even
assuming that a flag State and a coastal State come to agreement on
the adequacy of a safety assessment and the general reliability of a
particular vessel, the possibilities for controversy over safety still
are considerable, particularly in the absence of any clarification
of the unilateral acts which a coastal State is permitted to take to
protect itself. For example, a coastal State may find that a nuclear
vessel has not been operated strictly in accordance with the conditions of its safety assessment, but not in a manner that could
create a serious risk of a nuclear accident. To what extent would
the coastal State be justified in excluding the vessel from territorial
waters, or, more troublesome, from contiguous areas of the high
seas beyond territorial waters? Not only do the SOLAS proposals
fail to incorporate guides which might avoid controversy over such
questions, but the proposals, and indeed the 1948 SOLAS Convention itself,44 fail to provide or suggest means for resolving such
disputes.
4. Solving the Liability Problem. Finally, the approach of
the recently proposed amendments to the 1948 SOLAS Convention clearly is not conducive to a realistic resolution of the problem
of legal liability for radiation damage resulting from nuclear ship
accidents. As already noted,4 5 there was recognition at the Rijeka
Conference that governmental indemnities probably would be
necessary to supplement the private insurance coverage available.
However, it is distinctly possible that a number of small but active
maritime nations may be unable to make firm commitments to
assume :financial responsibility for damages from a nuclear accident
in amounts which States are likely to demand as a condition of
permitting foreign nuclear ships to enter their ports. This possibility suggests the need for a multi-national indemnification pool
and highlights the interrelationship between health and safety controls and a satisfactory resolution of the liability problem. If a
pooling of national indemnification commitments is necessary, the
acceptability of such an arrangement probably would depend on
the existence of means for all of the pooling nations to have at
least a sense of participation in approving the design and operating
ts Note 32 supra.
44 HYDEMAN & BERMAN,

45 Note

14 supra.

op. cit. supra note 2, at 345.
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plans for all vessels covered by the pool.46 The essentially unilateral approach to the health and safety control of individual nuclear ships adopted in the SOLAS proposals does not provide a
framework of control through which nations can acquire this
sense of participation in assuring the safety of foreign nuclear
vessels.
5. Conclusion. It seems clear from the foregoing analysis
that the 1960 SOLAS Conference proposals on nuclear ships, and
indeed the basic approach which underlies those proposals, are
conceptually inadequate for the time when a relatively large number of nuclear ships will be operating.47 Moreover, the proposals
will not create a climate that is likely to encourage the development and construction of nuclear ships. The best that can be said
of the SOLAS proposals is that they may not prove to be an immediate impediment during the period when governments are
willing to commit funds for the construction of experimental
vessels. In addition, of course, by recognizing the need for evaluating the hazards of each ship, as well as the importance of detailed
operating manuals and periodic surveys, the proposals do provide
a sound technological base for international agreement on a system
of control that could prove conceptually adequate.

Ill.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In order to achieve the objectives already described, and at the
same time to provide a control system that should prove acceptable
to the great majority of nations, we would offer the following outline of a convention on nuclear ship safety.
46 It is not at all clear that the Rijeka Conference recognized this need. Recommendation II of the Conference states: "In view of the international obligations which it will
obviously be necessary for the States to assume under treaty, the Conference also suggests
that some form of international machinery should be agreed upon to facilitate and ensure
the carrying out of these obligations." Note 8 supra. Although this language could be
construed to suggest some type of international health and safety control machinery that
would facilitate indemnity pooling arrangements, the inference is not easy to draw.
41 Although no major power recommended a more radical approach to control, it is
fairly clear that the Conference went about as far as it could in proposing departures from
the strictly traditional approach to ship safety. The Soviet delegate to the Conference,
along with others, strenuously objected even to the provision for the exchange of safety
assessments that was ultimately adopted. The objection was grounded on the conclusion
that requiring such an exchange would seriously hinder the development of nuclear propulsion. The Soviets apparently felt that no e.xchange of hazards information was necessary.
New York Times, June 14, 1960, p. 62, col. 7.
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International Evaluation of Nuclear Ships

Because detailed and precise reactor safety criteria are not now
possible, the key element of a reactor control system is the evaluation of the plant against a general criterion of safety. If such a
system is to be effective, however, means must be devised which
will assure that evaluations are adequate from the standpoint of
safety and that they result in a reasonably uniform application and
interpretation of the safety criterion. The most effective method
of accomplishing these objectives would be to have a convention
adopt a safety criterion and require that each commercial, or
nonmilitary, nuclear-powered vessel to be registered by a contracting State be evaluated by a permanent international organization
designated to undertake that function. The flag State would be free,
and perhaps should even be required, to conduct its own concurrent evaluation. In practical effect, the two evaluations could
complement and serve as reciprocal checks. Although somewhat
unique in concept, this international evaluation mechanism appears to be the only practicable answer to the limitations inherent
in a unilateral approach to the problem.
The international evaluation body would be performing a
vital service for States that have not developed the skills essential
to the evaluation of reactor hazards. It also would provide those
States with an independent assessment of the hazards of each nuclear ship. In addition, since such a body is likely to be quite objective about particular nuclear vessels, its determinations should
provide all nations with considerable assurance of the safety of
other vessels and of the protection of the resources of the marine
environment.
Further, evaluation by an international body ought to minimize
the potential financial and administrative burdens on those operating nuclear ships. In this context, international evaluation
should result in the application of reasonably consistent safety requirements and in limiting to two the number of detailed evaluations likely to be required. Also, since the international body
could, and presumably would, conduct its evaluation concurrently
with design and construction of a vessel, any necessary changes in
the reactor system or hull could be made at a time when modifications remained feasible and least costly. Finally, because of the
breadth of experience it would acquire, the evaluation body rapidly should become the repository of a vast amount of information
on various techniques of reactor design and fabrication. This con-
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centration of knowledge could prove to be a convenient and
valuable source of technical assistance to nations interested in the
manufacture or purchase of reactors.
Admittedly, evaluation by an international body will involve
some risk that particular determinations may, through the individuals who serve on the body, reflect national political considerations. However, such a risk could be minimized if the international body were to employ a full-time staff to evaluate reactors
instead of following a regular practice of using consultants who
may have less insulation from their respective governments. In
any event, since a group judgment is involved, the impact of the
views of one or two members acting occasionally on the basis of national political motivations should not be too great.
B.

International Certification of Nuclear Ships

In addition to evaluating nuclear ships, the international organization should be authorized to issue a safety certificate to a
vessel which it has determined complies with the safety criterion
and other requirements of the convention. To alleviate the disadvantages which stem from the right of States to exclude vessels
arbitrarily from their ports, certification by the international body
should create an affirmative obligation on the part of coastal States
to permit a vessel to enter. Obviously, a convention provision
that certification by the organization would bind contracting States
to admit nuclear vessels to ports would afford ship operators the
greatest measure of advance assurance. It is doubtful, however,
that such a provision would be acceptable to many States. On the
other hand, if an international certificate were given prima facie
force and effect, the operator would be afforded a reasonable degree
of assurance without precluding coastal States from exercising independent judgments. This result could be achieved by imposing
an obligation on contracting States not to exclude a certificated
vessel from ports or territorial seas without first making an affirmative determination that the construction or operation of the vessel
failed to conform to the general criterion of safety adopted by the
convention. In effect, member States would be agreeing to use
the evaluation report prepared by the international body as a
yardstick for their own determinations. Thus, while coastal
States would not be bound to admit vessels approved by the international body, a determination by a State that a particular vessel
did not conform to the safety criterion would, as a practical matter,
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have to refute the technical validity of the evaluations made by
the international body and the flag State.
The advantage of this approach is that it imposes a heavy moral
burden on coastal States to accept ships which have been certificated
by the international body without imposing a legal obligation
which would render the convention politically unacceptable. It
is worth noting also that this approach is more analogous, in effect
at least, to the control of conventional vessels under the Load Line
and Safety of Life at Sea conventions than is the approach to the
control of nuclear ships taken by the 1960 SOLAS Conference. An
international evaluation report would provide States with the kind
of objective, detailed specifications for assessing the safety of a
nuclear vessel that the Load Line and Safety of Life at Sea conventions provide through precise safety standards.
C.

Agreement on Rights and Obligations

Certainly if a convention is to adopt this positive approach of
imposing a prima facie obligation on coastal States to admit nuclear vessels holding an international certificate, it should clarify,
and in some respects expand, the rights of those States to take acts
necessary to protect their interests.
Requiring a coastal State to make an affirmative determination
before excluding a nuclear vessel presupposes that State's right to
inspect the vessel at some time prior to a proposed entry. The
potential magnitude of impact of a major nuclear accident suggests the necessity of authorizing coastal States to conduct their
inspections at some point more distant than just outside ports, as
well as the desirability of specifying the right of coastal States to
inspect nuclear vessels traversing territorial seas without the intention of entering adjacent ports. Consequently, a convention
should give contracting States a right to require prior notice from
nuclear vessels intending to enter territorial waters and should
authorize such States to inspect at the time the vessel enters the
territorial sea. While providing for inspection at greater distances
from shore would afford coastal States even more assurance of safety,
the inconvenience probably is not warranted in the case of vessels
that have been certificated by an international evaluation body.
In addition to desiring to inspect nuclear ships at a considerable
distance from their shores, it is quite conceivable that contracting
States may not want to open all of their ports to foreign nuclear
vessels until more operating experience has been acquired. In
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recogmt10n of this, the convention should permit contracting
States to close some of their ports to all foreign nuclear ships. So
long as the closed ports are specified at the time a State ratifies the
convention, foreign nuclear ship operators could plan accordingly.
However, if the over-all purpose and spirit of such a convention is
to be achieved, this closure of individual ports to all foreign nuclear vessels would have to be consistent with a general obligation
on each contracting State to open a reasonable number of its ports
to certificated nuclear vessels.
It also is possible that contracting States may need temporarily
to close ports or territorial seas to all nuclear ships because of
special hazardous circumstances. For example, the impending arrival of a tidal wave would justify a coastal State in excluding all
nuclear vessels from any ports likely to be affected. A convention
would have to give contracting States a right to take reasonable
acts of this nature under emergency circumstances.
As we have seen, international law is not entirely clear with
respect to the rights of vessels in distress when the condition of
distress could constitute a risk to the safety of the coastal State.
Generally, vessels in distress have a right of free access to the ports
of foreign States. Although the humanitarian rationale for this
rule would seem to afford equal justification for the exercise of
reasonable control by a coastal State over a vessel in distress that
seeks access to one of its ports, the kinds of control that a State can
exercise under these circumstances are anything but well defined. 48
When viewed in a context of the potential hazards of nuclear ships,
this lack of clarity suggests the desirability of a specific provision
in the convention granting States the right to deny entry to nuclear
vessels in distress upon an affirmative determination by the State
that the risk to its interests would outweigh the risk to the vessel
and the cargo and persons abroad. Of course, the State should have
an obligation to take all reasonable steps to alleviate the adverse
impact on any vessel so excluded.
Finally, a convention might also clarify the rights of coastal
States with respect to nuclear vessels that either have not been
certificated by the international organization, or whose certificates
have been suspended, revoked, or not renewed as required. Manifestly, such vessels deserve little consideration from the community
of nations. Consequently, it would not be inappropriate, because
~s See

HYDEMAN & BERMAN,

op. cit. supra note 2, at 153, and materials cited therein.
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of the range at which reactor accidents can cause harmful effects,
to give each State a right to exercise jurisdiction and control over,
and to prohibit the operation of, any uncertificated vessel at as
great a distance from its coast as the State deems necessary to protect
persons and property within its territory.
D. Agreement on the Mechanisms of Control
I. Regulations. In addition to establishing a system of international evaluation and certification, and clarifying various rights
and obligations of nuclear vessels and coastal States, a convention
also should impose an affirmative obligation on flag States to maintain adequate controls over the nuclear vessels which they register.
A general obligation of this nature should, of course, be reinforced
by such detailed safety requirements as are possible with respect
to the construction, operation, and navigation of nuclear ships.
Although nuclear ship technology has not yet reached a stage at
which the development of precise safety criteria is possible, greater
standardization and more experience will facilitate the development of increasingly detailed standards. As this occurs, it will
become ever more important that there be a stimulus for national
adoption of internationally prescribed regulations. And, if the
regulations are to be maintained reasonably current, uniform, and
of a calibre that will give the greatest possible protection to all
nations, means also must be devised to facilitate their amendment
and to assure the greatest possible degree of national conformity
to such amendments.
Experience has proved that these goals will not be achieved
unless the parties to an international convention are required to
take affirmative steps in order not to be bound by new or amended
regulations. It is clear also that the needs of an era of rapid technological development cannot be met by convening diplomatic
conferences at widely separated intervals of time in order to develop
appropriate regulatory amendments. Thus, a convention on the
safety of nuclear ships should authorize a permanent international
organization to recommend safety regulations which would be binding on all contracting States that fail to take an affirmative exception within a specified period of time. In addition, because the
hazards of nuclear-powered ships are considerable, regulations or
amendments determined to be of particular significance from the
standpoint of safety should be made binding on all contracting
States once they become binding on a majority of those States. A
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number of existing conventions incorporate these kinds of provisions for encouraging the adoption and assuring the harmonization
of national regulations that have international impact.49
Of course, some regulatory aspects of nuclear ship control are,
and will remain, inherently incapable of standardization. For
example, variations in local traffic conditions and port characteristics would make it unrealistic to attempt to prescribe uniform
speed limits and docking or mooring requirements. Such matters
must be left to local authorities. A convention, however, could
minimize the burden of special requirements by specifically delimiting the matters which are within the discretion of local authorities
and by requiring that local rules be made currently available to
all contracting States.
2. Inspection and Enforcement. Because the consequences of
a serious reactor accident could be disastrous, a convention on
nuclear ship safety should incorporate every practicable means for
assuring that contracting States comply ·with their obligation to
maintain continuing control over flag vessels. This suggests a need
for a system of independent inspection of individual ships, as well
as for penalties which can be imposed on States that have not fulfilled their commitments.
Under the foregoing recommendations, coastal States that are
parties to the convention would have a right to inspect certificated
nuclear vessels just prior to their entry into the State's territorial
sea. This right of inspection might include monitoring radiation
levels, physical inspection of the reactor plant, and examination
of logs or other operating records. If coastal States are required to
conduct inspections in accordance with an international inspection
manual, and to report infractions of the convention's rules to an
international body, there would be a frequent check, by independent experts, on the safety of individual nuclear vessels. Add
to this a requirement of a periodic survey of such vessels and their
operating records by the international evaluation group, and ample
means probably would exist for determining whether flag States
and vessel operators are complying with their obligations under
the convention.
To the extent that noncompliance is disclosed, the international body, as a minimum, should be authorized to suspend or
revoke its safety certificates. In addition, sanctions should be avail40

Id. at 317-25.
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able for imposition against a flag State, as contrasted with a vessel
owner,50 if the investigation of an infraction discloses that the State
itself has been delinquent in controlling a ship bearing its registry.
Certainly a suspension of the right of a flag State to have any of its
nuclear flag ships treated as being properly certificated would
neither be unreasonable nor unprecedented.51 In addition, consideration should be given to the advisability of more stringent
sanctions such as imposing embargoes on atomic energy materials,
technical information, and research assistance to defaulting States.
Naturally, special procedures, such as a vote of two-thirds of the
contracting States, would have to be devised for purposes of determining when to impose particular sanctions.
Consideration might also be given to the need for the imposition of sanctions on noncontracting States whose flag vessels fail to
meet international standards. The right to impose sanctions on
noncontracting governments is warranted when failure to conform
to international codes of conduct could jeopardize the interests of
the whole community of nations. Such an extension of sanctions
beyond contracting parties also is supported by precedent.52
3. Resolution of Disputes. Finally, a convention should provide a mechanism for the resolution of disputes in the absence of
agreement by the parties to an alternative means of settlement.
Even if the recommended clarifications of rights and obligations
are adopted, disputes probably will arise. For example, nations
may disagree as to whether particular circumstances afforded ample
justification for the temporary closure of a port to nuclear vessels,
or whether the exclusion of a particular vessel in distress was reasonable under the circumstances. Since such disputes are more
likely to involve complex scientific and technical issues than strictly
legal questions, it may be appropriate to consider the advisability
of establishing a special panel of experts to render arbitration
services.53 A permanent arbitration panel could be established by
50 It would seem reasonably clear that, aside from the revocation or suspension of a
ship's certificate, States would resist direct punitive action by an international organization
against the operator of a vessel.
51E.g., Convention on International Civil Aviation, December 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180,
T.I.A.S. No. 1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295, Art. 88.
52 Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of
Narcotic Drugs (1931), July 13, 1931, 48 Stat. 1543, T.S. No. 863, 139 L.N.T.S. 301, Art. 14;
International Opium Convention (1925), Feb. 19, 1925, 81 L.N.T.S. 317, Art. 24; CHARTER OF
THE UNITED NATIONS, Arts. 41-42.
53 The other alternative would be to provide for the submission of disputes to the
International Court of Justice. However, difficulties caused by existing reservations to the
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the convention, or provision could be made whereby the executive
body of an appropriate international organization could appoint
expert panels to deal with particular disputes.
E. Organizational Responsibility for Administering the Control
System
The designation of an international organization to administer
the provisions of a convention on nuclear ships is another matter
that must be settled. Controlling nuclear ships clearly is a problem
which calls for global agreement. Regional organizations may have
appropriate roles of a supplemental character, but effective control
would seem to require that an international body of world scope
assume primary responsibility. Two existing organizations of
global scope encompass talents and experience particularly pertinent to the controls that are necessary. One is the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) which came
into being in 195854 to take consultative and advisory cognizance
over matters of maritime safety.65 The other is the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Statute of the IAEA authorizes the Agency to adopt "standards of safety for protection of
health and minimization of danger to life and property ... " 56 in the
field of atomic energy. The relationship agreement between the
Agency and the United Nations recognizes the IAEA "as the agency
. . . responsible for international activities concerned with the
peaceful uses of atomic energy."67 Thus, the charters of both organizations provide some justification for each to claim primary
responsibility for the control of nuclear ships. However, it is the
radiation hazard that supplies the justification for the special controls recommended, and the United Nations relationship agreement with the IAEA does seems to recognize the Agency's primacy
in matters of nuclear safety.
In addition, there are several practical reasons for reposing
primary responsibility in the IAEA. The most cogent of these
jurisdiction of the Court, and the possibility of delays resulting from the Court's having
to cope with complex technical matters, do not commend this choice. For a more detailed
discussion of this alternative, see HYDE!llAN & BERMAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 340-41.
54 Convention

of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization, March

6, 1948, T.I.A.S. 4044.
Gu Id., Art. I (a).
tiO STATUTE OF THE
G7 U.N. Doc. No.

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Art. III, para. A, 6.
A/3620, Art. I (I) (1957), adopted by the United Nations on Nov.
14, 1957, U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc., 12th Sess., Annexes, 2 (1957).
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stems from the need for an international body to establish a fulltime staff to evaluate the safety of ship reactors. The IAEA has
begun to gather a staff of experts in the field of reactor safety and
already has developed some experience in evaluating land-based
reactors. This same staff could, with a limited amount of assistance
from individuals expert in general matters of ship safety, perform
the identical function in connection with nuclear ships. The converse, however, is not true; the ship safety experts of IMCO would
need considerable assistance from a variety of nuclear experts in
order to evaluate reactor hazards effectively. Because the number
of individuals who are qualified and willing to undertake this task
is small, any assignment of responsibility which would require the
establishment of an additional reactor safety group at the international level should be avoided.
The Agency's present activities in two other closely related
areas also suggest the desirability of giving it primary responsibility
for developing and administering a convention on the international
control of nuclear ships. The international community already
has assigned responsibility with respect to the sea disposal of radioactive wastes to the IAEA.68 Since the disposal of atomic wastes
from nuclear-powered ships is likely to constitute a significant
segment of sea disposal activities, it will be desirable to harmonize
the systems ultimately adopted for controlling nuclear vessels and
the dumping of radioactive wastes at sea. The IAEA also has indicated its intention to consider the problem of the liability of nuclear ship operators.69 As we have seen, a close correlation of solutions to the liability and health and safety control problems may
be essential.60 Obviously, the most effective coordination of these
interrelated problems can be achieved if primary responsibility is
vested in a single competent body.
In final analysis, an effective system for controlling the hazards
of nuclear ships will require the talents of both IMCO and the
IAEA; therefore, no matter where primary responsibility 1s reposed, cooperation between the two will be essential.
58 Resolution on Pollution of the High Seas by Radioactive Materials, U.N. Doc. No.
A/CONF.13/L.53 (1958).
59 Statement by the Director General of the IAEA at the opening of the Agency's third
General Conference on Sept. 22, 1959, reported in Bureau of National Affairs, Atomic
Industry Reporter, News and Analysis 5:319 (1959).
60 See discussion supra, p. 246.
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CONCLUSIONS

This outline of a convention for the multinational control of
nuclear ships01 admittedly constitutes a significant departure from
the traditional pattern of maritime safety conventions. However,
precedents, or very close analogies, for most of the recommended
elements of control can be found in existing multinational agreements.02 Thus, the recommended approach is not so unique, at
least in a general context of international accord, as it might at first
appear. To the extent that such a control system does represent a
departure from tradition in the field of maritime safety or in international law, it may be sufficient to observe that there is nothing
traditional about the hazards of atomic energy and that problems
of new magnitude frequently demand novel solutions.
Just when such a convention on the safety of nuclear ships will
become essential, rather than merely desirable, is not susceptible
of precise delimitation. There are, however, factors which indicate
the advisability of beginning to consider the long-range requirements promptly. First, although there exists at present a general
atmosphere of pessimism about the early achievement of economically competitive nuclear ships, technological progress frequently
exceeds expectations. Adequate health and safety controls should
precede any significant growth in the number of nuclear ships.
Second, achieving agreement between nations depends very considerably on the ease with which national interests can be reconciled. Efforts to achieve accord, therefore, should be made before
national adherence to a unilateral concept of control becomes too
fixed. Third, the process of achieving international accord, particularly when agreement involves a significant departure from
tradition, may require a considerable period of time. Certainly
a lapse of ten years for the development and ratification of a
convention of the type necessary is not beyond the realm of possibility.03 Finally, early agreement on the type of convention out61 A more detailed description of such a convention is set forth in HYDEMAN & BERMAN,
op. cit. supra note 2, at 363-73 •
62 Id. at 316-45. Although the concept of evaluation by an international body is the
element of control which finds the least support in precedent, even that is merely another
means, necessitated by the present state and complexity of reactor technology, for achieving
the well-accepted goal of protecting public health through international agreement on
standards of safety. See discussion supra, pp. 249-50.
63 It is interesting to note that the Convention of the Intergovernmental Maritime
Consultative Organization, supra note 54, was signed in March 1948 and did not enter into
force until March 1958. For a description of the halting steps toward ratification, see
REIFF, THE UNITED STATES AND THE TREATY LAW OF THE SEA 220-22 (1959).
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lined may be a prerequisite to any substantial development of commercial nuclear ships. Therefore, to encourage the development
and use of nuclear-powered vessels for peaceful purposes, we should
begin promptly to plan more adequately for the future.

